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Abstract: Having a sense of dignity is one of the core emotions in human life. Is 
our dignity, and accordingly also our sense of dignity under threat in elderly care, 
especially in robotic care? How can robotic care support or challenge human dignity 
in elderly care? The answer will depend on whether it is robot-based, robot-assisted, 
or teleoperated care that is at stake. Further, the demands and realizations of human 
dignity have to be distinguished. The demands to respect humans are based on human 
dignity and the inalienable high and equal moral standing that everyone has. For hu-
man moral agents, these demands take the form of negative and positive duties. For 
robots, they arguably take the form of corresponding ought-to-be norms. The realiza-
tions of dignity consist in variable responses to these demands, by oneself by others, 
and by society at large. This article examines how robot-based, robot-assisted, and 
teleoperated care can amount to realizations of dignity. The varieties of robotic care 
can, in different ways, be responsive to the demands of dignity and recognize humans 
as vulnerable beings with needs, as autonomous agents, and as rational subjects of 
experience, emotion, and thought.
Key words: care robotics, elderly care, human dignity, vulnerability, agency, cogni-
tive capacities, subjectivity
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1. Introduction
Having a sense of dignity is one of the core emotions in human life, yet is this sense 
under threat in elderly care, especially in robotic care? Does robotic care maintain 
or, in contrast, ignore human dignity in elderly care? This paper addresses these 
questions and the ways in which robotic care can support or challenge human dig-
nity in elderly care. We begin with two introductory sections. In the first of these 
(section 1.1), we offer a brief overview over the state of the art in care robotics, 
and distinguish robot-based, robot-assisted, and teleoperated care. In the second 
introductory section (section 1.2), we suggest that the notion of human dignity is 
best analyzed as having two aspects. First, dignity involves an inalienable aspect 
of a high and equal moral standing, which poses demands to respect humans (e.g., 
as autonomous agents, as subjects of experiences, emotions and thoughts, and 
as vulnerable beings); these can be called demands of dignity. For moral agents, 
these are negative and positive duties, and for robots, these take the form of corre-
sponding ought-to-be- norms. Second, dignity involves the realizations of dignity 
in variable responses to these demands (expressions of self-respect in one’s own 
actions and attitudes, received recognition and misrecognition in interaction with 
others, and the quality of living conditions consistent with human dignity). Section 
Two through section Five investigate in detail how robot-based, robot-assisted, 
and teleoperated care can be responsive to demands of dignity and recognize hu-
mans as vulnerable beings with needs, autonomous agents, and as rational subjects 
of experience, emotion, and thought.1
1.1. Care Robotics
Within the past ten years, care robotics has emerged as a serious technology that 
could partially solve the challenge of the increasing need for care services for 
the elderly. Multiple developed nations are facing a challenge of an oncoming 
ageing population. For example, the share of people aged 65 and older within the 
population is rising in the European Union (EU28) from 18.4 percent in 2013 to 
a predicted 28.4 percent by 20602 (see Figure 1). Some governments are already 
taking action in order to be able to provide quality health care services for the 
increasing number of people who need them. For instance, Japan invests heavily 
in the development of robots to improve efficiency in care services, to decrease 
caregivers’ physical burdens, and to improve the quality of life in care facilities 
through tools of recreation.3
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Figure 1. Projections for the share of the people aged 65 and over of the population in EU28, Finland, 
Germany, and Japan4
Care robotics is a sub-area of robotic technologies consisting of a wide 
variety of applications. Currently, it is hard to say about their actual impact on 
the quality of life of the elderly, or on the quality or efficiency of care work. In 
a review of the effectiveness of assistive technologies for seniors (Khosravi and 
Ghapanchi 2015), only tele-health applications for people with chronic illnesses 
were found to be clearly effective. In another review (Khosravi, Rezvani, and 
Wiewiora 2016), robotic applications for wellbeing were noticed to be somewhat 
effective, particularly on reducing loneliness of older people. The applications 
included the therapy robot seal Paro5, the robot dog Aibo6, a telepresence robot 
and a robot walking support. A more recent review (Pu et al. 2019) concluded that 
social robots appeared to have various positive impacts on quality of life for older 
adults, such as reducing agitation and anxiety. However, Lihui Pu and colleagues 
(ibid.) as well as Tobias Krick and colleagues (2019) pointed out that high-quality 
studies are rare in the field; this seriously limits drawing conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the technology.
Regardless, a number of new assistive robotic products and services can be 
expected to be introduced to this growing market within ten to twenty years (In-
ternational Federation of Robotics 2018). For instance, the sale of exoskeletons 
for rehabilitation and ergonomic support for reducing loads is already expected 
to grow significantly by 2020, about double the 5,600 units sold in 2016 (ibid.). 
369Demands of Dignity in Robotic Care
Adoption of this technology is likely to change elderly care, and the perspective 
of the care receivers and the elderly themselves should, naturally, be heard in the 
development and adoption of such.
Within the last decade, the developmental trends in robotics have included 
humanoid robots, natural interaction, therapy robots, and social robots (Goeldner, 
Herstatt, and Tietze 2015). In social robotics, the main publication trends have 
concerned robots as social partners as well as robots supporting children’s devel-
opment and assisting elderly people (Mejia and Kajikawa 2017). Maybe reflecting 
the trendy emphasis on social interaction, the image that tends to dominate public 
discussions of robotic care is that of naturally interacting humanoids. For instance, 
the capabilities of care robots are being compared to those of human caregivers, 
and it is asked whether a care robot can replace a human caregiver in his or her 
job.7 This indicates a background belief that a care robot might be able to do all, or 
at least a considerable amount of, the care tasks that currently are performed by a 
human—but not as well as the human would do. These lines of thinking could par-
tially explain why surveys on the acceptance of, and positive and negative attitudes 
towards, robots in society tend to show lower acceptance for care robots compared 
to robots applied in other domains. For instance, 45 percent of the citizens in 
the EU28 countries felt at least moderately comfortable about the idea of having 
robots provide services or companionship to elderly or infirm people, whilst 61 
percent were positive towards robots and artificial intelligence in general (Special 
Eurobarometer 460, 2017; for a recent study about healthcare professionals’ at-
titudes toward robots, see Turja et al. 2018).
Older people have surely been considered in the context of care robotics in 
the past. Their perspective, attitudes, and expectations with regards to care robots 
has been investigated with questionnaires, focus group studies, interviews and citi-
zen panels (e.g., Čaić, Odekerken-Schröder, and Mahr 2018; Harmo et al. 2005; 
Frennert, Eftring, and Östlund 2013; Niemelä and Melkas 2019; Pino et al. 2015; 
Wu et al. 2014). A number of case studies and field trials have been implemented to 
understand their needs and uses of technology (e.g., Cesta et al. 2016; Hebesberger 
et al. 2017; Niemelä, Van Aerschot, et al. 2019; Sabelli, Kanda, and Hagita 2011; 
Stafford et al. 2014), and ethical issues concerning robots and older people have 
been discussed widely (Draper et al. 2014; Jenkins, and Draper 2014; Kemenade, 
Konijn, and Hoorn 2015; Sharkey and Sharkey 2012a; Sharkey 2014; Sorell and 
Draper 2014; Vandemeulebroucke, Dierckx de Casterlé, and Gastmans 2018).
As a summary, it seems that elderly people’s acceptance of robots in care 
depends on:
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• their perceived need for the robot, which depends on their state of health;
• the expected benefits of the technology, with regards increased safety;
• the concerns they may have about the technology, with regards to privacy 
and usability;
• whether they have alternatives to the robot, for example help from family 
or a spouse;
• the social influence they receive from their environment, for example en-
couragement or pressure from family;
• and their personal characteristics (cf. Peek et al. 2014).
Ethical assessments of robotics use in elderly care has also been discussed 
from the viewpoint of dignity (see Vandemeulebroucke Dierckx de Casterlé and 
Gastmans 2018; Wilson et al. 2016; the debate was sparked largely by Sharkey 
2014; Sharkey and Sharkey 2012a, 2012b). Dignity is often taken to encompass 
the more specific reasons for the acceptance of technology, such as safety, respect 
for privacy, and autonomy.8
Nevertheless, there are many questions that the current state of the art con-
cerning the relevance of dignity in elderly care has not satisfactorily addressed. 
In this paper, we will further the debate by drawing four kinds of distinctions and 
examining systematically the questions that these distinctions enable us to make. 
Firstly, we show the importance of distinguishing clearly the two faces of human 
dignity as categorical demands on the one hand, and as their variable realizations 
on the other. Secondly, we argue that these realizations can take place in one’s 
own actions, in recognition from others, and in living conditions that are consis-
tent with one’s dignity. Thirdly, we show the importance of analyzing different 
kinds of recognition, especially recognition of vulnerability, agency, and cognitive 
capacities of persons. Fourthly, we discuss systematically how these aspects of 
dignity are in different ways at play in robot-based, robot-assisted, and teleoper-
ated care. Let us next introduce these concepts.
1.2. Robot-based, Robot-assisted, and Teleoperated Care
Robots can provide support for the caregiver through robot-assisted care, or they 
can provide care activities themselves through robot-based care. In robot-assisted 
care, the robot can be physically close to the elderly person, for example when a 
caregiver uses a lifting robot, or the robot can be in the background, for example 
when a robot performs delivery or cleaning tasks that do not directly interact with 
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an elderly person. In robot-based care, the robot has direct interaction with the 
elderly person, for example as a home assistant robot, or the robot is possibly 
assisted by a caregiver, for example in therapy when recreation robots are used 
in care homes. It is widely thought that the human dignity of an elderly person 
is particularly threatened in robot-based care; since “robots can’t love” there are 
essential aspects missing in the realization of human dignity. But what should 
we think when a robot interacting with an elderly person is fully teleoperated by 
a caregiver? This category of care robots falls between robot-assisted and robot-
based care (Figure 2). In other forms of robot-assisted care, the care personnel 
are present. The absence of care personnel in situ means that teleoperated robots 
constitute a special case for the human dignity question, which is worth examining 
separately.
Figure 2. Categories of robotic care.
Distinguishing between these three kinds of robotic care enables us to pose 
the question: how does using robotic care in these different ways influence the 
dignity of older people?
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2. Two Aspects of Dignity:  
The Inalienable Status and the Variable Realizations
This paper approaches dignity in a novel and systematic way as having essen-
tially two kinds of aspects (Laitinen, Niemelä, and Pirhonen 2016). Firstly, as 
an inalienable feature, human dignity, or D1, is a source of strictly undeniable, 
stringent, and unconditional normative claim; dignity is something that everyone 
possesses automatically and equally merely because they are humans or persons. 
The normative demands of dignity do not diminish, regardless of how badly one 
is treated, or even if one behaves in an undignified manner oneself. When it is said 
that one loses one’s dignity due to the way he or she behaves, or due to the way one 
is being treated or due to the circumstances in which one is forced to live, it is not 
meant that one no longer has a moral status consisting of the peremptory norma-
tive claim. Even mass-murderers, slaves, or people forced to live in the gutters, 
retain their human rights and human dignity in the sense of the moral demands or 
claims.
The second aspect of dignity, or D2, is contingent and gradable in how fully 
it is realized in actual living. It can be realized to a higher or lower degree in one’s 
own actions, emotions, and self-relations. It can also be realized in interactions 
with others, and in one’s living conditions. Even though the demands of dignity 
are categorical and based on an inalienable standing, these dimensions of ways 
in which people act and are treated by others vary. It is this variable aspect that 
varies, when one is said to “lose one’s dignity.”
These two aspects can be labeled the inalienable aspect D1 (See Section 2.1) 
and the variable aspect D2 of dignity (See Section 2.2). The novelty of this paper 
is the systematic study of these aspects of dignity in the context of three kinds of 
robotic care, and regarding three aspects of human existence. We do not claim that 
these three aspects, which will be explained in the following section, exhaust all 
important dimensions of human existence, but instead serve to illustrate important 
aspects of dignity that should be respected in the context of robotic care.
2.1. Negative and Positive Duties, and Ought-to-Be Norms,  
Based on Inalienable Dignity
One of the most undisputed moral premises is the great and equal moral stand-
ing of persons, underlying universal and equal human rights. In Immanuel Kant’s 
(2011) theory, everyone ought to be treated as an end itself and not as a mere 
means. Each human being, as a rational being, has infinite worth and dignity, in-
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stead of a mere measurable value or price. No one is to be sacrificed in the name of 
the general good. Dignity in this sense is not dependent on achievements, or even 
on one’s own dignified behavior or self-respect. So, what is dignity based on then? 
It is typically taken as depending on the central capacities of persons, however, 
various other theories of the basis of dignity have been presented.9 We will further 
not contribute to the debate on the grounds of dignity as we take the inalienable 
dignity of all human persons as an established moral starting point.
In virtue of inalienable dignity, there are strict moral boundaries to how a 
person can and cannot be treated; the inalienable dignity is to be respected, not 
violated, and any interactions must take place within the boundaries of respect 
for dignity. The easiest way to meet this demand without violating boundaries is 
simply by doing nothing, or at least by not interacting with anything that has an 
inalienable standing. In contrast, positive duties require actual contributions—the 
helping of those in need.
There are many ways to classify norms based on the inalienable dignity of 
human persons. We will here pick out three aspects that we concentrate on, yet we 
make no claims that these three exhausts all relevant aspects. Our considerations 
of dignity demand that we:
• protect each other as vulnerable beings with needs, or H1;
• that we respect each other as autonomous agents, or H2;
• and respect and engage with each other as beings with sophisticated inner 
lives, as rational thinkers, emoters and subjects of experience, or H3.
These three aspects of human existence have been central in the debates on 
interpersonal recognition (Honneth 1995; Ikäheimo 2014; Iser 2019; Laitinen and 
Pirhonen 2018; Laitinen 2002), and constitute three “targets” of respect for human 
dignity. They all are relevant in elderly care and help in assessing the ethical ac-
ceptability of robotic care.
The perspective H1 concerns the recognition of the vulnerability and needs 
of human beings; an elderly person here fulfills the role of care receiver. The 
relevant kinds of robots in usage here range from lifting aids to cognitive and 
recreational support and therapy, for example the therapy robot seal Paro. The 
difference between robot-assisted, robot-based, and teleoperated care is likely to 
be relevant here (see Section 3).
The perspective H2 is concerned with the recognition of the agency of the 
person; supporting physical actions and the practical aspect of autonomy. The rele-
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vant robots used here include intelligent rollators, robots that can simulate the role 
of care-recipient, and activation robots. Similar to H1, the differences between 
robot-assisted, robot-based, and teleoperated care is relevant (see Section 4).
Perspective H3 examines recognition of a person as a thinker and a subject of 
emotions and experiences. Here the cognitive aspect of autonomy and respecting 
an elderly person’s personal experience and opinions are relevant; how they are 
acknowledged or accepted by others will affect their self-relations (Honneth 1995; 
Taylor 1985). Again, robotic care can be assessed from the perspective of recogni-
tion of this aspect of human existence (see Section 5).
Taking these aspects of human existence into account, human dignity grounds 
for example the following three negative and positive duties to all moral agents 
(compare, e.g., to Beauchamp and Childress 2013; Körtner 2016):
• a negative duty of not harming others, and positive duty of taking due care 
of human needs and protecting vulnerabilities;
• a negative duty of not blocking people’s autonomous agency, and positive 
duty of aiding and supporting people’s autonomous agency;
• and a negative duty of not blocking people’s rational thinking and subjec-
tivity, and positive duty of aiding and supporting people as thinkers and 
subjects of experience.
We can call breaches of the negative duties violations of human dignity, and 
successfully meeting the negative duties, by omitting to harm someone, create 
respect for human dignity. Further, we can call breaches of the positive duties 
neglect of human dignity, and successfully meeting the positive duties, typically 
by engaging in right kinds of activity, create positive support for human dignity.
What relevance do these distinctions have for considering the role of robots 
in securing dignity in elderly care? To answer this, it is helpful to start from the 
duties that moral agents, or those capable of literally having duties, have because 
of the dignity of those persons who are “moral patients,” or persons as objects of 
moral concern. If robots are moral agents, they have such duties literally. If they 
are not moral agents, they should arguably nonetheless be built to be such agents 
so that they function accordingly; they ought to be such that the dignity of moral 
patients is not violated, but is supported.10 Concerning any artefacts, there can be 
such ought-to-be norms literally, even if they would not have ought-to-do duties; 
clocks ought to be such that they show time reliably, chairs ought to be such that 
they do not collapse under human weight, and so on. Many kinds of responsibili-
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ties and ought-to-do norms follow for agents; clockmakers ought to make clocks 
that work, salespeople should warn customers if the clocks they are selling are not 
very reliable, and people agreeing to meet each other, should warn each other if 
their clocks are not reliable in keeping time. Concerning robots, such responsibili-
ties are, or should be, similarly aligned to engineers, salespeople, users, mainte-
nance people, and legislators.
Only moral agents literally have duties. Nevertheless, robots ought to be built 
so that they do not harm, yet protect vulnerable humans and help meet human 
needs. They ought to be such so that they do not block people’s autonomous 
agency, rational thinking, or equality, but rather are of help in aiding and sup-
porting those aims. Thus, the same list of concerns can be construed as a list of 
ought-to-be norms based on human dignity, applicable to robots even when they 
are not moral agents themselves.11 These are:
• not harming others, and helping satisfy human needs and protect 
vulnerabilities;
• not blocking, but aiding and supporting people’s autonomous agency;
• and not blocking, but aiding and supporting people as thinkers and subjects 
of experience.
Suppose a robot causes a violation of the dignity of the elderly patient. Is the 
robot to blame? Did it violate its duties? Only if the robot is a genuine moral agent 
can it have duties or violate its duties, and only then does it makes sense to hold 
it responsible for its behavior. If it is not, then the manufacturers, sellers, owners, 
trainers, users, legislators, and democratic choosers of legislators will, in different 
ways, have to share the responsibility. This is a practical challenge for how social 
practices of holding responsibility will develop.
But even in the case that the robot is not a genuine moral agent, not to be 
literally praised or blamed, it can still cause both genuine damage and genuinely 
good outcomes. When a tree falls and hurts an animal or a person, it may cause 
genuine damage, yet does not literally act wrongly or immorally. It might be 
counter-intuitive to say that a falling tree did not respect one’s dignity, or violated 
claims based on dignity. However, we can argue that robots literally ought to be 
such that they do not cause harms or violations; ought-to-be norms should be 
applied to any artefacts, and to how they ought to function. In that sense, robots 
can violate the claims of human dignity, even if we do not assume that robots are, 
literally, moral agents capable of violation of duties. It is rather that they bring 
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about a severe harm that, if done by a moral agent, would constitute a violation of 
a duty (cf. Coeckelbergh 2009).
We have so far discussed the requirements or demands based on inalienable 
human dignity. For moral agents, these are duties, and concerning robots, they take 
the form of ought-to-be norms. How these requirements are met in practice, by 
each agent in their self-regard and in their recognition of others’ living conditions, 
will constitute the variable realization- aspect of dignity, to which we will now 
turn to. The difference is not in the demands, or the inalienable aspect generated 
by the demands of dignity however one is being treated, but that there is variability 
in how these demands are responded to in practice.
2.2. The Variable Aspects of Dignity:  
Own Actions, Interactions, and Conditions of Living
In a sense, nothing can challenge human dignity as an inalienable status and as a 
source of demands. Whether or not others respect one’s dignity, the status exists; 
others ought to recognize and respect it and robots ought to operate in such a way 
that violations do not occur. To what extent they do so may then differ, and in 
some sense “realizations” of dignity in interaction and practice may, thus, vary. 
In a similar sense, how people regard themselves can conceptualize realization 
of dignity to higher or lower degree. Some people may be especially worthy of 
appreciation or admiration or “appraisal esteem” because they manage to behave 
in very dignified ways; they manifest the dignified behavior in noteworthy ways. 
They maintain their dignity in adverse circumstances, or in facing the prospect 
of death, for example (cf. Waldron 2017). The dignity of humans also requires a 
decent standard of living to maintain humane functioning, and to be able to appear 
in public without shame or denigration (cf. Smith 1776; Nussbaum 2004).
There are thus three aspects to dignity as a varying realizable achievement. 
These are:
• one’s own attitudes and comportment can be more or less dignified;
• the way others interact with and recognize one can realize dignity to a 
higher or lower degree;
• and the cultural, material and institutional background conditions can be 
consistent with the demands of dignity (Laitinen, Niemelä, and Pirhonen 
2016).
Thus, although nothing can take away the inalienable status from humans, 
some people will have to live in worse conditions than the basic minimum that 
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human dignity would entail, and some people are treated in ways that are not re-
spectful of their human dignity, making them lack self-respect and act in undigni-
fied ways as a result. When that is the case, dignity in the variable sense is realized 
to a lower degree than otherwise would be possible.
It is relevant to note that an agent cannot meet one’s positive duties, or pro-
mote dignity, by doing nothing. Dignity is realized in how one’s living conditions 
are arranged, how interactions are conducted, and the degree to which one’s needs 
are being met. The demand is that these dependencies should be taken care of in 
a dignified manner and in ways that, to a fuller extent, realize and support the 
ways of being and doing in which human dignity exists. The relevant regard from 
others goes beyond keeping a respectful distance to such attitudes as genuine care, 
trust, gratitude, solidarity, and esteem or genuine recognition. Thus, being merely 
left alone is typically an affront to dignity in that one’s basic needs and social 
needs are thereby being neglected. Human beings are deeply dependent on each 
other, and the challenge is to negotiate these dependencies in ways that respect the 
dignity of each.
Similarly, the ought-to-be norms for robots, based on human dignity, should 
reflect the same aims of positively supporting and contributing realizations of 
human dignity. If these aims are not met, the introduction of robots may lead to 
a neglect of some aspects that could be supported by human agents or non-smart 
technologies.
2.3. Varieties of Respect and Neglect
In this article, we take three perspectives to recognition of dignity—vulnerability, 
agency, experiential and cognitive subjectivity—and through them analyze the 
potential effects of robotic care, and the dignity of the elderly in robotic care in-
teractions (see Sections 3-5). Concerning each, we also ask how the introduction 
of robots might lead to direct violations of dignity, and how robots can fail to 
provide further positive support for positive achievements of dignity. Concerning 
the positive aspects, it is easy to see how robots could help support dignity by 
assisting the agent’s own actions, and how they can be a smart part of living condi-
tions consistent with human dignity. However, it is more controversial whether 
interaction with, or recognition from, robots can be directly constitutive of human 
dignity; whether robot-based care could directly provide the needed recognition 
for patients. Robot-assisted or teleoperated care does not face a similar worry. 
These topics are summed up in the following table.
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Table 3: Realizations of dignity in robotic care, regarding vulnerability, agency and cognition.
Dignity 
realized 
in ↓
Concern 
for →
Vulnerability and 
needs
Agency Emotion and cognition
The inalienable 
status
(negative duty) not 
harming others; and 
(positive duty) taking 
due care of human 
needs and protecting 
vulnerabilities
(negative duty) not 
blocking people’s 
autonomous agency; 
and (positive duty) 
aiding and supporting 
people’s autonomous 
agency.
(negative duty) not 
blocking people’s 
rational thinking 
and subjectivity; 
and (positive duty) 
supporting people as 
thinkers and subjects of 
experience
Own action
(robot-assisted self-
care)
Positive: Robotic 
assistance for protection 
of safety in one’s own 
activity.
Violation: self-injury in 
using robots.
Neglect: neglect of 
one’s needs in one’s 
own action.
Positive: Increasing 
physical, agentic 
capabilities.
Violation: (robot-
assisted) disregard for 
one’s dignity in one’s 
action.
Neglect: neglect of 
one’s (future) needs in 
one’s own action.
Positive: Increasing 
cognitive capacities.
Violation: (robot-
assisted) disregard for 
one’s dignity in one’s 
action.
Neglect: neglect of 
one’s (cognitive) needs 
in one’s own action.
Robot-based 
“interaction” in 
care
Positive: needs met.
Violation: risk of injury.
Neglect: cannot provide 
human contact for 
social needs.
Positive: make more 
capable, strengthen and 
motivate.
Violation: risk of 
disability.
Neglect: cannot provide 
real interaction.
Positive: make more 
capable, challenge and 
stimulate.
Violate: risk of 
disability.
Neglect: cannot provide 
real recognition and 
communication.
Robot-assisted 
interaction in care
Positive: helping a 
nurse treat a person 
safely.
Violation: nurse causing 
pain or anxiety to a 
person by robot use.12
Neglect: sometimes 
may not provide human 
contact for social needs.
Positive: supporting 
a person’s own 
participation in 
treatments.
Violation: preventing 
a person’s own 
participation by robot 
use.
Neglect: sometimes 
may not provide real 
interaction.
Positive: robot taking 
care of hard work 
(e.g., lifting) enables 
nurses to concentrate 
on emotional needs of 
a person.
Violation: 
objectification of a 
person by robot use.
Neglect: sometimes 
may not provide real 
recognition.
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Dignity 
realized 
in ↓
Concern 
for →
Vulnerability and 
needs
Agency Emotion and cognition
Teleoperated 
interaction in care
Positive: client needs 
met with technological 
solutions.
Violation: possible 
injury and insult via 
teleoperation.
Neglect: cannot 
provide equally good 
human contact; some 
technologies restricted 
to communication, 
fewer aspects of 
wellbeing (e.g., smell, 
general view of an 
apartment) may be 
recognized.
Positive: supporting 
agency by 
strengthening and 
motivating.
Violation: possible 
violations of autonomy 
via teleoperation.
Neglect: cannot provide 
equally embodied 
interaction; mere 
instructions instead of 
action.
Positive: enables 
meaningful 
conversations for the 
lonely.
Violation: possible 
denial of cognitive 
autonomy in 
teleoperated interaction.
Neglect: sometimes 
may not provide real 
recognition; lack of 
comprehensive human 
interaction.
Background 
conditions of living
Smarter technology 
may be better, but may 
be more dangerous?
Smarter technology 
may be better, but will 
it require too much 
physically?
Smarter technology 
may be better, but will 
it dumb us down? Will 
it require too much 
cognitively?
One distinction that will be relevant throughout is the distinction between robot-
based and robot-assisted care—will robots replace or complement the work of 
human nurses? One central human right is that of the right to human contact, 
and the ethics of solitary confinement as a form of punishment has been widely 
discussed (Brownlee 2013). The central popular concern about social robotics is 
that they replace human contact. The following dark scenario comes from Amanda 
Sharkey (2014, 63):
An old lady sits alone in her sheltered accommodation stroking her pet 
robot seal. She has not had any human visitors for days. A humanoid robot 
enters the room, delivers a tray of food, and leaves after attempting some 
conversation about the weather, and encouraging her to eat it all up. The old 
lady sighs, and reluctantly complies with the robot’s suggestions. When she 
finishes eating, she goes back to stroking the pet robot seal: ‘At least you 
give my life some meaning’ she says, as the robot seal blinks at her with its 
big eyes, and makes seal-like sounds in response to her ministrations.
The common and important response to scenarios like this has been that ro-
bots are not meant to replace human contact, but to ease caregivers’ burdens in dif-
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ferent ways. Indeed, as Jari Pirhonen and Ilkka Pietilä (2015) remark, loneliness is 
already a serious problem in assisted living today. In reality, the old lady may sit 
in her room all alone, without the company of a robot seal, and a busy nurse would 
hastily pop in with the tray. The current reality may be even worse than Sharkey’s 
scenario. Furthermore, some applications, such as Paro, can increase contact for 
people suffering from dementia. As noted above, the robot appears to encourage 
and help to initiate social interaction with a therapist, caregiver, or another elderly 
person. There are also some indications that a robot giving a hug to a person mat-
ters at some emotional level. Shiomi et al. (2017) reports an experimental study in 
which being hugged by a sizable teddy bear robot encouraged people to tell their 
secret or personal issues to the robot, whilst those not given a robotic hug were less 
willing to self-disclose. Hugged participants also interacted longer with the robot.
Bodily integrity and human touch are delicate issues in assisted living (Par-
viainen and Pirhonen 2017). Here, robotics promises both good and bad pros-
pects. Assistive robotics may, for example, help the elderly visit the bathroom by 
themselves, if they wish to. On the other hand, decreasing human touch in care 
situations may endanger a profound human need, the very need to be touched by 
humans. According to Bush, people who suffer from dementia still have capa-
bilities to communicate through gestures and touching (Bush 2001). Rose Mary 
Langland and Carol Panicucci (1982) hold that the more confused elderly people 
are, the more touch-deprived they get. Regarding people with severe dementia, 
touch may be their most effective way of communicating, which emphasizes the 
quality of the toucher.
Another general remark can be made in that fairness or justice or the demand 
of treating people as equals will concern each of the three aspects—vulnerability, 
agency, and subjectivity. In some cases, this means treating people equally, in 
a “one size fits all” kind of treatment (Nussbaum 2009). But in cases of special 
needs, treating people as equals may demand providing more resources to those 
with special needs—those in wheelchairs are a classic example (Sen 1980). Even 
in cases where resources should be distributed differently in the name of fairness, 
it may be that there is some other “measure of justice” in terms of which people 
receive equal treatment. For example, the distribution of resources might be based 
on the idea that one should get what one needs. Another fundamental concern 
with social robotics is related to inequality. Will the benefits of robotics only be 
available to the better-off? Will the risks of decreasing human contact be actual-
ized for those who already are worse off? Such societal issues will not be solved 
by technological means, but rather, will partially depend on societal developments 
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as to whether more utopian or more dystopian prospects of technology will be 
realized (Sparrow 2016).
3. Robots and Concern for the Neediness and Vulnerability  
of Human Beings
So far, we have seen how the distinctions made help us draw a table of varieties 
of respect and neglect. The three remaining sections will discuss the aspects of 
human existence—H1, H2, and H3—one at a time. This section will discuss the 
demands that dignity poses concerning aspect H1 and our neediness and vulner-
ability, and how those demands may be met or left unmet in robotic care (cf. the 
column “needs and vulnerability” in Table 3).
As Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) puts it, human beings are dependent, rational 
animals. Vulnerability and neediness are deep-rooted in the temporal trajectory of 
our human existence. During childhood, this neediness is obvious. In adulthood, 
we picture ourselves as independent, and in old age the need for help increases 
again. Various disabilities and diseases may disclose our dependence during any of 
these stages. It is important that human vulnerability is recognized in the provision 
of elderly care, in caring for and caring about the elderly (Turkle 2011). As long 
as robots are not able to care about people, or about anything, their use in elderly 
care should be assessed carefully.
How to assess, then, the prospects of robotics is important—in what ways 
can they respect, violate, support, or neglect human vulnerability and neediness? 
In the following subsections, we will go through their possible indirect effects on 
the agents’ self-respect, the direct and indirect aspects of robot-based care, and 
discuss robot-assisted and teleoperated care as well as the contribution of robotics 
to general conditions of living.
3.1. Own Actions and Attitudes: Self-Respect
One thing robots can affect is how human dignity is realized in persons’ own 
actions and attitudes. Some might experience the very need for technological or 
robotic assistance in activities of daily living, or ADLs, as undignified. But in re-
flection, it is hard to defend such attitudes; the pace of the ideology of “manliness” 
and autarchy, dependence, and vulnerability must be fully acceptable aspects of 
human life (MacIntyre 1999). It is realistic to expect to need assistance with ADLs 
in old age, whether it be dependence on others or on technological walking, hear-
ing, or seeing aids. Naturally, the design of such assistive technology should ide-
ally enhance rather than diminish the subjective feeling of self-respect. What is 
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experienced as acceptable and subjectively enhancing varies contextually however 
(see Broadbent et al. 2012; Turja et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2014).
Human vulnerability is in probable tension with our own agency, as everyone 
is a source of risk for themselves as well. In elderly care, a balance is to be sought, 
for example on what level of safety is required for the elderly’s own activity, either 
at home or in assisted living. It is possible to err in two directions; too much risk, 
but also too much safety (or too rigidly preprogrammed satisfaction of needs) 
constitute problematic scenarios. Conceivably, robotic assistance could enhance 
human dignity by providing protection, and by enabling agency. But it could also 
diminish human dignity if used to create unnecessary risks or to restrict agency 
unnecessarily.
3.2. Dignity and Robot-based Care
With regards to robot-based care, what are the varieties of interaction possible? 
This question creates context for the concern that robots would replaces nurses. If 
robot-based care really were to replace nurses, what sorts of skills should robots 
have? Looking at the skills human nurses have, Patricia Benner (2000) has devel-
oped seven moral sources and skills of nurses. She suggests that nurses should:
1. have relational skills in meeting older people in their particularity;
2. be able to recognize when a moral principle, such as injustice, is at stake;
3. have skilled know-how that allows for ethical comportment and action in 
particular encounters in a timely manner;
4. have moral deliberation and communication skills that allow for justifica-
tion of and experiential learning about actions and decisions;
5. have an understanding of the goals and ends of good nursing practice;
6. participate in a community of practitioners that allows for character 
development;
7. and have the capacity to love oneself and one’s neighbor and have the 
capacity to be loved.
Programming these skills into care robots sounds extremely unlikely or is even 
impossible. As long as that is so, robot-based care on its own would be unable to 
provide the kind of interaction in which human dignity can directly be realized.
To overcome this dilemma of human-specific characteristics, researchers 
have suggested a differentiation of mere care-activities and nursing activities as 
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an answer (Turkle 2011). In this understanding, “care”-activities, as opposed to 
“nursing,” consists of all the “doings” in the field of care work, such as taking 
body temperature, giving medicine, bathing, feeding, and so on. Conceivably, 
many such care tasks could be accomplished by advanced robots (Santoni de Sio 
and Van Wynsberghe 2016). Such tasks and activities may amount to “taking care 
of” people, but genuinely caring about them requires empathy, which is, for the 
foreseeable future at least, out of robots’ reach. Empathy requires the skill to put 
oneself into the position of another, to imagine what it would be like to be in an-
other person’s situation. There is a deep human need for such empathetic encoun-
ters, to experience being emotionally cared about. Therefore, robot-based care 
seems to respect human dignity only to the extent that it is combined with human 
nurses who have more time and resources to spend with people, thus robot-based 
care is ethically acceptable only when combined with robot-assisted care (Decker 
2008; Sharkey and Sharkey 2012b).
Hence, the positive aspect of robot-based care could be that needs can genu-
inely be met, and the contingent risk is that the robots injure the patients and 
thereby violate demands rooted in their dignity. But as robots cannot provide the 
emotional human contact needed for meeting the social needs of care-recipients, 
robot-based care on its own amounts to neglect. If the human needs for social 
contact are amply met outside care-contexts, however, it may not be a very central 
concern that such needs are not met in the context of care-activities.
3.3. Assisted and Teleoperated Care, and Decent Living Conditions
Robot-assisted care has the obvious benefit that the presence of human nurses 
enables genuine human interaction. Of course, sometimes the robot-nurse team 
may not provide human contact for social needs, for example, if the robot takes 
the nurse’s attention away from the patient. With current robotic applications, this 
might easily happen due to malfunctions; field trials even with commercial ap-
plications report technical problems, such as Wi-Fi connectivity failures (Niemelä, 
Van Aerschot, et al. 2019).
Teleoperated care may be lacking in its capacity to perform the actual in-
terventions, if it is a matter of mere communication. This is the case with simple 
telepresence robots that only enable mobile video connection and do not include 
medical equipment or manipulators. Yet, in principle, teleoperated robots could be 
built with capacities for interventions. At least for medical purposes, such forms 
of teleoperation are already in use—doctors may listen to a patient’s heart or look 
into an ear from far away with instruments plugged into a telepresence device. 
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However, this kind of system may raise mixed feelings. In a pilot study of a telep-
resence robot equipped with a stethoscope and remotely used by a nurse to make 
health checks on older adults, both the adults and the nurse accepted the robot to a 
high degree and the adults felt “as if the nurse was present.” On the other hand, the 
usability of the robot was perceived as low and the nurses felt frustrated because 
they could not palpate or touch the patients (Vermeersch, Sampsel, and Kleman 
2015). Telepresence may not be of equal quality to genuine human presence, but 
of course is better than no contact at all to other people.
Finally, it can be added that technological progress, as an aspect of the 
background conditions of life, can lead to social advances that are consistent with 
human dignity, and smart technologies may be simply better at responding to 
human vulnerabilities and needs. On the other hand, they can of course also create 
distinct risks and dangers. For example, it is not clear how technological progress 
plays out within the scenarios of climate change and global ecological deteriora-
tion. Whether the good or bad potentialities of technology will be realized depends 
largely on the cultural and institutional backgrounds in different societies, and also 
on environmental conditions.
4. Recognizing the Agency of a Person
Agency is aspect H2, as previously discussed, of human existence that is relevant 
for maintaining dignity. As already pointed out, the goal of enhancing agency may 
conflict with the goal of protecting the vulnerable even from self-imposed risks. 
Higher degrees of agential capability may come with a higher sense of dignity, 
and robotic hindrance and support to these capabilities offer, accordingly, relevant 
questions. In particular, practical autonomy is relevant in this regard.13 Because 
the considerations concerning one’s own agency, recognition in robotic care, and 
living conditions are very similar to ones discussed in the previous section, this 
section is not structured in the same manner, to avoid repetition.
According to gerontological literature, Western culture emphasizes suc-
cessful ageing, where success is defined as activity, autonomy, and “anti-ageing” 
(Bowling and Dieppe 2005; Katz 2000). Thus, people who are obviously depen-
dent on other people may be seen as failures (Pirhonen 2017; Rozanova 2010). 
Also, moving to an assisted living facility has been described as a major event 
in older people’s lives, insomuch that becoming a resident at such means leav-
ing behind a private home, family, friends, pets, local communities, and previous 
lifestyles (Gubrium 1997; Grenade and Boldy 2008). According to Bethel Ann 
Powers (1995), older people may perceive care facilities as the “end of the line.” 
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Older persons losing their functional abilities are at risk of becoming “others” and 
risk losing their status as persons (Pirhonen et al. 2015; Gilleard and Higgs 2013).
Over the past decades, autonomy has become the watchword for describing 
a good quality of elderly care (Ball et al. 2004; Roth and Eckert 2011; Zimmer-
man et al. 2005). George Agich’s (2003) distinction between independence and 
autonomy is worth considering in the context of elderly care. Agich sees the differ-
ence between them through the participative role of an individual; an independent 
person makes and implements decisions on their own whereas an autonomous 
person makes decisions and implements them with help from others. Implementa-
tion of decisions calls for human agency. Agency can be seen as a practical side of 
autonomy; if one makes decisions regarding one’s life, but cannot put them into 
practice oneself, they are still in charge of their life, although lacking the practical 
aspect of independence.
Culturally, assisted living residents belong to the group of “fourth agers” due 
to their hampering functional abilities and increasing dependence on other people. 
In opposition to the freedom and opportunities of fit “third agers,” the fourth age 
has been pictured as a period of dependence, frailty, and death (Gilleard and Higgs 
2013; Laslett 1989). Indeed, Chris Gilleard and Paul Higgs (2010, 122) hold that 
residents of assisted living facilities have lost their cultural frame of reference 
regarding individual agency due to a failure in self-management and transfer 
into round-the-clock care. Could robots help such older people to maintain their 
agency and thus their dignity?
According to Pirhonen (2017), assisted living residents have their own ways 
of hanging on to their agency and thus avoid the feeling of being a burden despite 
hampering functional abilities. Two of his findings are particularly interesting re-
garding robots and human agency: that agency may be supported by technological 
aids, and agency may be delegated to other people.
We all use different aids every day to support our agency. We use transport 
to move around and eyeglasses to see where we are going. Long-term care (LTC) 
residents emphasized this agency-supporting nature of aids by, for example, tell-
ing how a walker enabled them to go to the bathroom independently, without any 
help from the nursing staff (Pirhonen 2017). Arguably then, the more advanced 
aids older people would have, the more agentic they could be. Advanced assistive 
robots might enable considerable agency for many older people, provided that the 
robots would be easy enough to use when, for example, operated via speech rec-
ognition. An example of a simple mechanical aid developing towards an assistive 
robot is the LEA, or Lean Empowering Assistance, a robotic rollator that actively 
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supports walking, navigates autonomously over to the user, detects obstacles on 
the way, and provides fitness exercises as well as reminders to the user.14
Pirhonen (2017) also found that residents seemed to delegate their agency 
quite willingly to other people. Many of his interviewees told that they had out-
sourced their finances to their children. A female resident who was unable to move 
around herself kept her closets in order by telling a visiting friend how her closets 
should be organized. A male resident said that he could not care less about what 
medication he was taking since he thought that the doctor was a more capable 
person to decide. Another female resident had let his son find a sheltered home for 
her. These people maintained their decisional agency while delegating the activity-
part of the agency to other people. In principle, this could just as well be done by 
delegating the activity-part to a robot, unless there is something in the nature of 
the activity that makes it an inappropriate or unfit task for robots (Santoni de Sio 
and Van Wynsberghe 2016).
Robots could conceivably support older persons’ agency in an efficient way, 
presuming that such elders are cognitively fit enough to utilize robots. Accord-
ing to previous research, older people struggle to avoid the feeling of being a 
burden to other people (Degnen 2007; Pirhonen et al. 2015). Robots could help 
them with this struggle and postpone the dependence on others. Still, in assisted 
living facilities, robots may serve residents and help them manage some tasks 
without the need to ask assistance from staff, affirming their sense of autonomy. 
Furthermore, robots do not become annoyed when residents sometimes express 
their needs constantly.
There is yet another agency-related advantage in assistive robots in care 
surroundings—they may help older persons to help other people despite of their 
hampering functional abilities. If one is able to use a robot to assist themselves, 
they are surely is able to help others with it. Older persons do want to be useful to 
others (Laitinen and Pirhonen 2018), and robots may make it possible.
Many robotic applications are designed to assist an old person in maintain-
ing their mobility and carrying out physical tasks, and so increase the autonomy 
or capacity to self-determination for that person (Hari Krishnan and Pugazhenthi 
2014). Similar to wheelchairs and walking supports, robotic walking supports or 
exoskeletons could, in principle, help independent living. On the other hand, if 
robotic devices are too difficult to use, they can decrease the person’s autonomy 
and feeling of control over one’s life.
Sometimes the capacity for self-determination is lowered, as in the case of 
children, the cognitively handicapped, or the demented. In these cases, the full right 
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of self-determination is lowered as well, and turned into “assisted self-determina-
tion.” One should not lose all autonomy rights the moment one’s capacities are 
slightly lowered. Apart from individual aspects, the principle of self-determination 
should extend to collective decision-making concerning the entry of robotics in 
care. For instance, the elderly should have the right to make their voice heard, with 
regard to whether robots are taken into use in the care home they live in.
One deep agential need for human beings is to take part as a contributor to 
the common good, and be esteemed as a contributor. This need concerns being or 
having been a useful member of the community and being a recipient of the grati-
tude of others, not merely being a burden to others. Arguably, a healthy, dignified 
relationship to the self also includes acknowledgement of dependence throughout 
life, which the phrase “burdens” distorts. This is often linked with the experience 
of becoming unemployed; job loss typically makes one economically worse off, 
but also entails losing the role in which one can be of use to others. The feeling of 
being “superfluous” accompanies losing one’s status as a contributor.
Older people also prefer to avoid becoming a burden to their close ones 
(Street et al. 2007). Typically, pensioners are considered to have already largely 
made their lifetime contributions and achievements, so they need no longer fill that 
role. On the other hand, within family and among neighbors, it is still equally re-
warding to be able to contribute. In this respect, something like the girl-like robot, 
Alice, that was designed to allow the elderly to take on the active role of helper 
or caretaker, seems like a perceptive innovation. Alice asks the older person, for 
example, to open the window (Koster 2015; Kemenade, Konijn, and Hoorn 2015). 
Responding to such requests may activate the elderly and perhaps get them to 
experience themselves as useful, at least to a girl-like robot. In this context, the 
worry about deception may however reappear -in what sense was this really help-
ful? Again, there is a clear preference for robot-assisted activation by a team of 
humans and robots, instead of robot-based activation by robots alone, as the latter 
may include deceptiveness which is not consistent with the dignity of the elderly.15
5. Recognizing Subjectivity and the Emotional and  
Cognitive Capacities of a Person
5.1. Recognition of Cognitive Capacities
Different types of robots may conceivably support residents’ self-respect and 
emotional self-acceptance. As proposed above, assistive robots may help older 
people’s agency and boost their self-esteem by giving them a chance to still help 
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others.16 In some situations, if robots functioned as “middlemen” between an older 
person and others, the risk for “epistemic injustice” might be reduced. Fricker 
(2007) holds that there are biases regarding who gets listened to in a conversation. 
For example, it is common that when an older person runs errands with an escort, 
people tend to speak to the escort instead of that older person. Would people speak 
to the older person if they were shopping with a robot instead of a human escort? 
Robots could someday even represent an older person with a difficulty to move 
around in meetings or national voting.
Another way in which the cognitive capacities and wisdom of the elderly 
would be recognized is to make the elderly themselves the trainers of AI and ro-
bots. They, if anyone, could teach the specificities of old age problem solving to 
the machines. Moreover, they have also accumulated more general human experi-
ence compared to younger people.
And more generally, the elderly should have a say concerning the norms of 
interaction—they should possess the standing or status as relevant judges con-
cerning common matters. Being invisible in this respect is a violation of dignity. 
Consider this passage from Rainer Forst:
The violation of human dignity consists in being ignored, not counting, 
being ‘invisible’ for the purposes of legitimizing social relations. In issues 
concerning human dignity, therefore, one should not think in terms of the 
end, of (objective or subjective) conditions or states of affairs, but of social 
relations, of processes, interactions and structures between persons, and of 
the status of individuals within them. (2012, 967)17
5.2. The Need for Emotional Recognition as a Unique Individual
It is a distinct human need to be emotionally recognized as a unique, irreplaceable 
person, leading one’s own life, and facing one’s own death. In addition to our 
biological vulnerabilities, this need creates a new type of vulnerability—we are 
dependent on others to give us recognition as an irreplaceable individual. Emo-
tionally, we need emotional affirmation from others (Honneth 1995).
In that regard, a possible positive aspect of robots could be that their capacity 
to identify the individual in question, and to adapt and personalize their behavior 
for any individual human being may someday be much better than the adaptability 
of humans. For instance, robots might learn to decode the speech of people with 
linguistic impairments.18 Again, there are two alternatives for the use of this fea-
ture: in robot-based care, the robots could be the interaction partner, which might 
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lead to a decrease in human contact and human dignity, and in robot-assisted care, 
they could facilitate interaction between humans.
Being someone’s parent, child, spouse, sibling, relative, friend, or lover in-
volves relationships with their own “logic.” In this logic, the other is an irreplace-
able, unique, and an individual. They are not like any other roles or offices one 
might have. In relationships of friendship or love, it would be absurd to think 
that one’s friend or loved one can be swapped with someone similar enough. The 
emotional attachment is to that one special, singled out individual.
Many concerns about robotics deal with emotional interaction. One of them 
is that robots lure people into fraudulent emotional interaction. The Alice robot ap-
parently was able to create emotional attachment from elderly users (Kemenade, 
Konijn, and Hoorn 2015). This may have happened since we form attachments to 
what we nurse and care for (Turkle 2011). But a robot is not capable of genuinely 
responding to feelings although a human being may be experiencing such—the 
one-way emotional attachment, interpreted to some extent as two-way by the 
human, can be seen as deception (Turkle 2011). Although Alice, too, is meant 
to be a robot to assist human relationships and not replace them, the deceptive 
relationship may entail harmful emotional consequences (Kemenade, Konijn, and 
Hoorn 2015). Deceptive attachment by a robot may not be of major concern for 
healthy adults, who are aware of the quality of interaction, but what about with 
children and demented elders? For instance, is it harmful for an elderly person 
suffering from dementia to form an attachment to a social robot? In a study by 
Marketta Niemelä, Mari Ylikauppila, and Heli Talja (2016), caregivers in nursing 
homes found Paro valuable in that elderly residents with dementia had positive 
feelings towards it and they wanted to take care of it. Paro enabled a certain sense 
of agency in the elderly—they were not mere passive receivers of human care. 
Whether the resident perceived Paro as a robot, seal, or baby during the act of 
caring, made no difference to the caregivers. Their training encourages them to 
accept the perception of the elderly. On the other hand, the caregivers saw that 
residents could not form long-term attachments to Paro, due to their dementia. 
With children, the long-term, fraudulent attachment to a social robot might have a 
more far-reaching impact, in terms of psychological development.
Recognizing such harmful impact on children would most certainly call for 
regulatory actions. One workable analogy might be digital games with age limits; 
perhaps the use of social robots and their behavior in terms of emotional engage-
ment will have to be restricted according to the age of the humans interacting with 
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the robot, or only allow robots to interact with a child user in the presence of a 
human caretaker.
One form of misrecognition of individual uniqueness of persons in care 
facilities is providing residents with standardized treatments, which means that 
everyone gets treated in the same way and not based on their individual features 
and desires (Pirhonen 2017). This phenomenon partly arises from the austerity 
regarding resources of care—hasty staff need scheduling and charting to deal 
with all the work required of them. There is also a great turnover regarding care 
staff, which leads to situations where residents do not know their caretakers and 
vice versa. Also, sometimes, there are attitudinal issues with staff, and one must 
admit that assisted living residents are as colorful a bunch of people as any other 
crowd. There are unpleasant and even mean residents, and sometimes illnesses 
and medication related behavior result in bad conduct, which tends to keep staff 
distant (ibid.).
Robots would not mind residents being nasty and they could conceivably be 
programmed to “remember” every client’s personal characteristics once they are 
recorded. A suitable robotic device could conceivably always remember that Ann 
needs to use an asthma inhaler in the evenings, that John’s feet need lotion twice a 
day, or that Ella drinks only from a glass, never a mug. Robots have no reason to 
avoid a person, they do not have favorites. If a robot works as a nurse’s partner, it 
could conceivably remind the nurse about all these facts. It might also remember 
the details long after an older person has forgotten about them. Equipped with 
face recognition technology, robots can recognize individual people already today. 
With advances in recognizing non-verbal social signals, such as subtle gestures 
and facial expressions, and finally human feelings, someday robots may really 
help older persons in care facilities to be treated as dignified persons until the end 
of their days.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we have discussed the nature of care robotics and robotic care from 
the viewpoint of the dignity of the elderly. Dignity poses demands, which in the 
case of human agents are duties, and in the case of robots, they are corresponding 
ought-to-be norms. Dignity is to be respected, not violated or disregarded; pro-
moted and not neglected. We have discussed three kinds of responses: self-respect, 
respect from others, and conditions of living consistent with human dignity. We 
have also distinguished three dimensions in which these demands and responses 
can be assessed—namely those related to human vulnerability, to human agency, 
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and human subjecthood. We have identified various uses for robots which might 
conceivably enhance human dignity, and ones which would create disrespect. 
Overall, the findings can be summed up as “it depends”; robot-based care, robot-
assisted care, and teleoperated care can each contribute to realizations of human 
dignity both positively and negatively, and it will expectably depend on the insti-
tutional and cultural settings whether positive or negative effects dominate. The 
aim of this article has not been to empirically examine this, but to distinguish the 
various ways that robotic care could affect human dignity, and so provide avenues 
for further study.
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people may have lost some of these capacities with age, but that does not lessen their 
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status, argue the humanists. Whether robots are, or will be, persons will depend cru-
cially on what the person-making characteristics are, and whether they include capaci-
ties that robots do not or cannot have (for humanists, of course, robots will never have 
the high moral status as they will never be humans) (Gunkel 2017; Bryson 2010; Jones 
2016).
10. On ought-to-be norms, see Sellars 1968, Wedgwood 2007, and Tuomela 
2013.
11. For an overview of the relevant technological solutions suitable for this, in-
cluding the use of an ethical governor capable of restricting robotic behavior to pre-
defined social norms and an ethical adaptor which draws upon the moral emotions 
to allow a system to constructively and proactively modify its behavior based on the 
consequences of its actions, see Arkin, Scheutz, and Wagner 2012.
12. Human nurses are better in interpreting from movements, gestures, and facial 
expressions when patients feel uncomfortable, even if patients cannot say it out loud. 
For more, see Parviainen and Pirhonen 2017.
13. The Capability Approach typically stresses the aspect of agency, humans as 
agents and not merely passive recipients, see, e.g., Coeckelbergh 2012.
14. http://www.robotcaresystems.com/robot-lea/.
15. It is also an important message, in order to enhance the self-respect of the 
elderly, that to be cared for is not to be a “burden.” After all, if others enjoy contribut-
ing, the so-called burden is often welcome. Furthermore, to the extent that one cares 
for the other, the well-being or suffering of the other is constitutive of the well-being 
or suffering of oneself. Or, in regard to professional caregivers, the patients’ need to be 
cared for is the very presupposition of their very practice. People in the professional 
roles work for the person, but the word “burden” suggests that it is done reluctantly.
16. Some previous literature has seen care robots to secure older persons’ intima-
cy regarding toileting and showering better than human nurses (Vandemeulebroucke, 
Dierckx de Casterlé, and Gastmans 2018).
17. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to keep this aspect 
(standing as a relevant judge) systematically present in thinking about the effects of 
robotic care to the dignity of the elderly.
18. Cf. Arkin, Scheutz, and Tickle-Degnen (2014) and Pettinati and Arkin (2015) 
for a robotic mediator, that would reduce stigmatization of Parkinson’s Disease (PD) 
patients via artificial moral emotions, thus enabling the carer-patient—relationship to 
be consistent with human dignity. So-called “facial masking” reduces the ability of PD 
patients to express moral emotions, and the robotic device aims to report these on their 
behalf (cf. also Hegel et al. 2011).
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